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What Does “Assessment” Mean? The Supreme
Court’s Misinterpretation of the Tax
Injunction Act and its Disregard for
Principles of Comity in Hibbs v. Winn Leads
to the Adjudication of State Tax Credit Issues
in Federal Court
Sean M. Stegmaier*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our federalist society, constitutional jurisprudence and
respect for the federalist principles on which our Constitution is
based demand that state governments be granted deference to
administer their own tax systems without unwarranted and
unprovoked federal intrusion.1 Therefore, if a State has a
legitimate interest in increasing attendance at its private and
secondary schools, and chooses to offer to its taxpayers a tax
credit in order to achieve this legitimate interest, the federal
government should stay its hand and allow the State to arrange
its fiscal affairs in whatever manner it deems necessary and
appropriate. Congress recognized the imperative need for the
states to arrange their tax systems without unnecessary federal
court interference when it enacted the Tax Injunction Act in 1937
(TIA), which provides in its entirety as follows: “[t]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”2
The statutory language of the TIA clearly indicates the
* J.D. Candidate with an Emphasis in Taxation Law, Chapman University School of Law,
May 2006; B.A. Business Economics, B.A. Philosophy, University of California at Santa
Barbara, June 2002. I would like to thank the entire Chapman Law Review staff for their
dedication and diligence in making publication of this Note possible. I would also like to
thank Professor Celestine McConville for her informative comments and insight. I
sincerely thank my family for their guidance, inspiration and encouragement. Finally,
and most importantly, I would like to thank Michelle for being my source of motivation
and for always believing in me. Without her, none if this would have been possible.
1 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 710 (3d ed. 1999).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
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intent of Congress: as long as the respective State is able to
provide an adequate State court remedy for any challenge to an
aspect of the State’s tax system, federal district courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over so delicate an area as a State’s
tax administration. Furthermore, because the TIA “has its roots
in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition
of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal
operations,” federal courts, through congressional decree and
longstanding principles of comity, are obligated to defer to and
respect a State’s administration of its tax system.3 By allowing
federal district courts to adjudicate challenges to state tax
credits, despite the clear statutory bar imposed by the TIA, the
Supreme Court in Hibbs v. Winn has effectively shown complete
disregard for Congress’ intent in enacting the federalism-based
statute, and has furthermore abandoned venerable principles of
comity, which require federal courts to defer to the states in
administering their respective tax systems.4
Part II of this Note discusses the Arizona State tax credit
offered in Arizona Revised Statute § 1089,5 and how the Arizona
statute was first challenged in the Arizona Supreme Court by a
group of Arizona taxpayers. Part II goes on to discuss Hibbs v.
Winn and the opinions of both the majority and the dissent. Part
III of this Note begins by addressing the inherent difficulties in
accepting the Supreme Court’s holding and heavily relies on the
arguments and reasoning set forth by the dissent. Part III goes
on to discuss the potentially hazardous consequences to state
sovereignty stemming from the Supreme Court’s holding in
Hibbs v. Winn, and how the Winn Court ignored the broad
federalism underpinnings of the TIA.
II. HIBBS V. WINN—A STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Arizona Tax Credit Goes to the Arizona Supreme Court
In 1997, the Arizona Legislature enacted Arizona Revised
Statute § 43-1089 (A.R.S. § 1089), which permits State tax
credits
for
contributions
made
to
“[s]chool
tuition
organization[s]”6 (STO) by Arizona taxpayers.7 The A.R.S. § 1089
Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976).
Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2004).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(F)(3) provides the following: “‘[s]chool tuition
organization’ means a charitable organization in this state that is exempt from federal
taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and that allocates at least ninety
per cent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants to children to
allow them to attend any qualified school of their parents’ choice. In addition, to qualify
as a school tuition organization the charitable organization shall provide educational
3
4
5
6
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tax credit allows an Arizona taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit for up to $500 per year for contributions made to STOs
during the taxable year; married couples who file a joint return
are permitted a tax credit of up to $625.8 The tax credit offered
under A.R.S. § 1089 differs from tax deductions for contributions
to nonprofit schools in that A.R.S. § 1089 offers a credit against
total taxes owed, and does not merely reduce a taxpayer’s income
that is subject to taxation.9 Furthermore, the tax credit can only
be used to reduce a taxpayer’s total amount of taxes owed by the
allowable amount (i.e., $500 maximum credit for a single
individual or $625 for a married couple filing a joint return), and
the taxpayer is not entitled to any type of tax refund based on the
taxpayer’s contribution.10
A.R.S. § 1089 imposes certain limitations and requirements
on the manner in which STOs are to facilitate taxpayer
contributions. First, the tax credit is not allowed if the taxpayer
designates the donation to the STO for the direct benefit of any
dependent of the taxpayer.11 Second, the STOs are required to
spend at least ninety percent of the contributions on educational
scholarships and grants for children so that those children can
attend private or secondary schools.12 Third, beneficiaries of the
STO’s funds must be from at least two different schools.13
Finally, an STO cannot distribute funds to students who attend
schools that discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap,
familial status or national origin.14
Approximately two years after the Arizona Legislature
enacted A.R.S. § 1089, several Arizona taxpayers challenged the
statute in the Arizona Supreme Court, arguing that the Arizona
statute violates the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution,15 as well as three provisions of the Arizona
Constitution, since the statute authorizes the use of funds raised
through the State tax system to directly support religious

scholarships or tuition grants to students without limiting availability to only students of
one school.”
7 Winn v. Killian, 307 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(A)(1)-(2).
9 Id. § 43-1089(A).
10 Id. § 43-1089(B).
11 Id. § 43-1089(D).
12 Id. § 43-1089(F)(3).
13 Id.
14 Id. § 43-1089(F)(2).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I (the Establishment Clause, made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part that, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”). See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 8 (1947) (Justices unanimously agreed that the Establishment Clause applies to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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education.16 Ultimately, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
A.R.S. § 1089 did not violate either the United States or the
Arizona Constitution, and that the STO tax credit was therefore
a valid exercise of the Arizona Legislature’s prerogative.17
B. The Arizona Tax Credit Finds its Way into Federal Court
In February 2000, another group of Arizona taxpayers
(Taxpayers) brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona (federal district court) against Mark W.
Killian (Director of Revenue),18 in his official capacity as the
Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, alleging that the
A.R.S. § 1089 STO tax credit program violates both the United
States and Arizona Constitutions.19 The Taxpayers sought to
enjoin any future operation of the STO program and an
injunction requiring the return of funds already distributed to
but not yet spent by the STOs to the State’s general fund.20
The Director of Revenue moved to dismiss the suit on two
theories: (1) immunity from suit pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment;21 and (2) the federal district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction due to the TIA22 and principles of comity.23
Without ruling on the Eleventh Amendment argument, the
federal district court granted the Director of Revenue’s motion to
dismiss the suit on grounds that the TIA and principles of comity
preclude the Taxpayers’ suit in federal district court.24
The TIA provides in its entirety as follows: “[t]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”25
In arguing that the TIA barred the Taxpayers’ suit in district
court, the Director of Revenue urged that the relief sought by the
16

(1999).

Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 921

Id. at 625.
J. Elliott Hibbs replaced Mark W. Killian as the Director of the Arizona
Department of Revenue on January 6, 2003, and was therefore substituted as the
Defendant in this action when it reached the United States Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 4 n.1, Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004)
(No. 02-1809) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
19 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1014.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1014-15; U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
23 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1014-15.
24 Id. at 1015.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
17
18
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Taxpayers—enjoinment of the STO program—would interfere
with Arizona’s system of tax “assessment” as that term is used in
the TIA.26 Essentially, the Director of Revenue adopted a broad
reading of the term “assessment,” arguing that it refers to the
overall system by which the State determines a respective
taxpayer’s overall tax liability to the state.27 The federal district
court agreed with the Director of Revenue’s argument that the
STO tax credit fell within the purview of Arizona’s tax
“assessment,” and accordingly dismissed the Taxpayers’ suit.28
The federal district court further held, as an alternative
ground for dismissal of the suit, that principles of comity
required dismissal of the Taxpayers’ suit.29 According to the
federal district court, any federal court action that disrupts the
tax administration of a state is barred by principles of comity,
regardless of whether the action relates to tax collection, tax
deductions, or tax credits.30 Therefore, even if invalidation of the
contested tax policy results in an increase in state revenues (as
would be the case with the invalidation of the STO tax credit
program), this nevertheless constitutes federal interference with
a state’s tax administration, and therefore violates principles of
comity.
The Taxpayers appealed the federal district court decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth
Circuit), which reversed the federal district court’s decision,
holding that neither the TIA nor principles of comity barred the
Taxpayers’ federal challenge to the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit.31 In
Winn v. Killian, the Ninth Circuit’s decision turned on the
applicable meaning of the term “assessment” as used in the TIA,
and concluded that both the Director of Revenue’s and the federal
district court’s reading of the term was overly broad, and that the
TIA does not cover the STO tax credit.32 The Ninth Circuit
referred to common dictionary definitions in determining the
meaning of “assessment” as used in the TIA. The Ninth Circuit
claimed two definitions as relevant: “(1) ‘to estimate officially the
value of (property, income, etc.) as a basis for taxation,’ and (2) ‘to
impose a tax or other charge on.’”33 Regarding the first definition
26 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1015. Unless otherwise indicated by the context, when the term
“assessment” appears in quotation marks within the text of this Note, the term is to be
understood in its general usage.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1018.
30 Id.
31 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1020.
32 Id. at 1015.
33 Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 90 (1979)).
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of “assessment” offered by the Ninth Circuit, the court found it
persuasive that “the STO [tax] credit available to a taxpayer is a
uniform amount that is applied to the calculation of taxes after a
taxpayer’s gross income has been determined and therefore plays
no part in the ‘assessment’ of property or income as a basis for
the imposition of taxes . . . .”34 The Ninth Circuit found the
second definition inapplicable to the STO tax credit because
A.R.S. § 1089 did not impose a tax; rather, it benefits taxpayers
by excusing them from paying an already assessed tax.35
Essentially, in establishing a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability,
the Ninth Circuit narrowly defined “assessment” to cover only
those tax calculations made in the course of determining a
taxpayer’s gross income, and not those made after gross income
has been determined.36
The Ninth Circuit referred to the two purposes of the TIA in
concluding that the relief sought by the Taxpayers, if granted,
would not result in a violation of the purposes or policies behind
the TIA as desired by Congress in enacting the statute in 1937.37
The first purpose, which the Ninth Circuit did not view as
relevant, involved the ability of foreign parties to bypass state
courts for the more favorable federal district court forum in tax
cases.38 According to the Ninth Circuit, the second purpose of the
TIA was to prevent the disruption of a state’s ability to collect tax
revenues.39 While admitting that the Ninth Circuit had not
previously ruled on the TIA’s application to state tax credits, the
court ultimately held that the TIA does not bar a suit challenging
a state tax credit in a federal district court, since the invalidation
of a tax credit does not affect a state’s ability to raise revenue and
therefore does not violate the second purpose of the TIA.40 On
the contrary, if the courts invalidated the STO tax credit,
Arizona’s ability to raise tax revenues would actually be
enhanced, since the contributions that were otherwise going to
the STOs would be redirected into the state fund.41
In the latter part of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit addressed
Id. at 1015 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 6.
Winn, 307 F.3d at 1016.
Prior to passage of the TIA, foreign parties could sue a state for injunctive relief in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and avoid paying the disputed tax in
state court until the case was resolved. State residents, on the other hand, could not
obtain diversity jurisdiction and were forced to litigate the matter in state courts, which
required the resident taxpayer to pay the tax deficiency prior to litigation. Id. at 1016
n.6.
39 Id. at 1016.
40 Id. at 1017.
41 Id.
34
35
36
37
38
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the federal district court’s alternative ground for dismissal of the
action: principles of comity preclude suits that involve federal
court interference with state tax systems.42 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Arizona’s tax administration would not be
substantially affected if A.R.S. § 1089 were invalidated, since
A.R.S. § 1089 represents such a small portion of Arizona’s tax
system.43 Furthermore, because principles of comity apply to
federal court injunctive relief that affect a state’s ability to collect
tax revenue, and because invalidation of A.R.S. § 1089 would
increase Arizona’s tax collection, principles of comity do not bar
the Taxpayers’ suit.44
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the federal
district court decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the
case en banc.45 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kleinfeld
criticized the Ninth Circuit’s adopted definition of “assessment,”
and instead used a broader definition of “assessment” as “the
process of calculating a person’s final tax bill after all deductions
and credits are accounted for.”46 In support of this broad
definition of “assessment,” Judge Kleinfeld referred to definitions
of the term found in another lay dictionary,47 a law dictionary,48
and the Internal Revenue Code.49 According to Judge Kleinfeld’s
broad definition of “assessment,” the TIA plainly “deprives the
federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin states from granting tax
credits as part of the calculation of taxes due.”50 Furthermore,
Judge Kleinfeld stated that even if the TIA does not bar the
Taxpayers’ suit, principles of comity would act as a bar to the
suit, since “long before Congress passed the [TIA], federal courts
ordinarily declined jurisdiction over challenges to state taxes.”51
Judge Kleinfeld stressed the importance of not assuming that
federal judges are in the exclusive position of interpreting the
Constitution and the people’s federal rights, since “[s]tate judges
Winn, 307 F.3d at 1018.
Id. at 1020.
Id.
Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
46 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 912 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 131
(1981) (an “assessment” is “the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing”)).
48 Id. at 912 n.10 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (6th ed. 1990)
(“assessment” refers to “determining the share of a tax to be paid by each of many
persons”).
49 Id. at 912 n.12 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6203 (2002) (“assessment shall be made by
recording the liability of the taxpayer”)). Unless the context indicates otherwise, all
references to a “Section,” “§,” the “Code,” or “IRC” are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 as in effect on June 1, 2004.
50 Winn, 321 F.3d 911, 913.
51 Id.
42
43
44
45
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take the same oath to uphold the federal Constitution that
[federal judges] do, and like [federal judges] are subject to federal
Supreme Court review.”52
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding and its Reasoning
In Hibbs v. Winn, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the TIA bars constitutional
challenges to state tax credits.53 The Court, in a 5 to 4 decision
delivered by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the Ninth Circuit, thus
allowing the Taxpayers’ suit challenging the A.R.S. § 1089 tax
credit to proceed in federal district court without impediment
from the TIA or principles of comity.54
Justice Ginsburg noted that federal courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have previously adjudicated
challenges to state tax credits and have never before viewed the
TIA as precluding federal court jurisdiction.55 Justice Ginsburg
noted the line of post-Brown v. Board of Education56 cases in
which states used tuition grants and tax credits in an effort to
promote racial segregation in public and private schools, and how
the Court upheld the Constitution’s equal protection requirement
under these challenges without impediment from the TIA.57
Justice Ginsburg therefore rejected the Director of Revenue’s
argument that the TIA prohibits all lower federal court
interference with state tax systems.58
Justice Ginsburg first determined that the Taxpayers sought
the following forms of prospective relief: injunctive relief
prohibiting A.R.S. § 1089 tax credits for payments made to STOs
that make religion-based grants; a declaration that A.R.S. §
1089, on its face and as applied, violates the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution; and an order that the
Director of Revenue notify all participating STOs that all funds
within their possession are to be returned to the state general
fund.59 With this in mind, Justice Ginsburg asked whether this
prospective relief, in terms of the TIA, “seek[s] to ‘enjoin, suspend
Id. at 914.
Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004). The Court first dealt with the issue of
whether Director of Revenue’s petition for certiorari was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c),
and ultimately concluded that the petition was timely, thus giving the Court jurisdiction
to decide whether the TIA bars Taxpayers’ suit. See id. at 2284. This issue is not
relevant for purposes of this Note, and thus merits no further discussion.
54 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281-82.
55 Id. at 2281.
56 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2284-85.
52
53
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or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law.’”60 The answer to this question turned on the meaning
of “assessment,” as used in the TIA, to determine if a challenge to
a state tax credit falls within the prohibition of the TIA.61
In determining the correct meaning of “assessment,” Justice
Ginsburg ruled that it is imperative to read the term in its
context and not in isolation.62 According to Justice Ginsburg, if
the term “assessment,” as the Director of Revenue asserts, were
in isolation to mean “the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for
charging or taxing,” the TIA would have no need for the words
“levy” or “collection” that follow “assessment” in the language of
the statute.63 Essentially, the term “assessment” would be all
that is necessary for purposes of the TIA, since this expansive
reading of “assessment” would necessarily include the functions
of “levy” and “collection.”64 Because the Court follows the “rule
against superfluities” in a statute, Justice Ginsburg refused to
accept the Director of Revenue’s definition of “assessment” as
encompassing the entire taxing scheme, since this would render
the terms “levy” and “collection” superfluous.65
Justice Ginsburg criticized Justice Kennedy’s dissenting
opinion (discussed infra) for adopting a conflicting position on the
According to Justice
proper definition of “assessment.”66
Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy’s dissent twice adopts the Director of
Revenue’s definition of “assessment” as “‘the entire plan or
scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing,’” but later defines
“assessment” in a manner that “would disconnect the word from
the enforcement process (‘levy or collection’) that ‘assessment’
sets in motion.”67
Based on the TIA’s legislative history, Justice Ginsburg
ruled that the TIA was modeled on earlier federal statutes that
paralleled state provisions prohibiting “‘actions in State courts to
enjoin the collection of State and county taxes.’”68 Of particular
influence was the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA),69 which bars “‘any
court’” from adjudicating a suit brought “‘for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any [federal] tax.’”70
Id. at 2285 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
Id. at 2285.
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2285.
Id. at 2286 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).
66 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2286 n.4.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2286 (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 1 (1937)).
69 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2005).
70 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2286 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2005)).
60
61
62
63
64
65
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According to Justice Ginsburg, the AIA was meant to serve two
main purposes: (1) to reflect the Government’s desire to assess
and collect taxes as quickly as possible without judicial
impediment; and (2) to require that the legal right to any
disputed sums be a suit for refund.71 Therefore, just as the AIA
prevents federal court injunctions over federal tax collections, the
TIA prevents federal court restraints over state tax collections.72
In discussing the legislative history of the TIA, Justice
Ginsburg held that the Senate Report identified two staterevenue-protective objectives of the TIA:
(1) to eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek
injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state corporations
asserting diversity jurisdiction—and taxpayers with recourse only to
state courts, which generally required taxpayers to pay first and
litigate later; and (2) to stop taxpayers, with the aid of a federal
injunction, from withholding large sums, thereby disrupting state
government finances.73

Based on this legislative history, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that in enacting the TIA, Congress focused on taxpayers who
sought to avoid paying their taxes by resorting to a federal court
forum, which is not the procedure specified by the Internal
Revenue Service.74 Justice Ginsburg therefore read the TIA’s
legislative history as not indicating a congressional purpose to
prevent all federal court interference with state tax systems.75
In discussing the legislative history of the TIA, the Director
of Revenue argued that Congress, in enacting the TIA, relied on
the congressional purpose underlying the Johnson Act of 1934.76
The Johnson Act provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or
compliance with, [public-utility rate orders made by state
regulatory bodies].”77 In juxtaposing the TIA with the Johnson
Act, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the two Acts were
significantly
different
in
their
respective
underlying
congressional intents, since “[t]he TIA does not prohibit
interference with ‘the operation of, or compliance with’ state tax
laws,” but instead prohibits interference only with the areas of
state tax systems that are used to generate revenue, such as

Id.
Id. at 2287.
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 1-2 (1937)).
Id. at 2288.
Id.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 20 (citing California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 409 n.22 (1982)).
77 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2003).
71
72
73
74
75
76
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assessment, levy, and collection.78
Justice Ginsburg held that the TIA, consistent with the will
of Congress, has been interpreted by the Court to only apply to
cases in which the state taxpayer attempts to avoid paying state
taxes by seeking the aid of the federal courts.79 In furthering this
position, Justice Ginsburg cited California v. Grace Brethren
Church,80 in which the Court “recognized that the principal
purpose of the TIA was to ‘limit drastically’ federal-courtGrace
interference with ‘the collection of [state] taxes.’”81
Brethren Church, according to Justice Ginsburg, dealt with
taxpayers who attempted to institute federal actions in order to
bypass available state remedies, precisely what the TIA is meant
to prohibit.82 Justice Ginsburg announced that Grace Brethren
Church stands for the proposition that the TIA does not prevent
federal court review of all aspects of state tax systems, but
instead prevents federal court review only of issues pertaining to
the collection of revenue in state tax systems, which is contrary to
the positions taken by both the Director of Revenue and the
dissent.83
Justice Ginsburg next addressed the issue of what
constitutes “‘a plain, speedy and efficient remedy’” in a state
court as required by the TIA.84 Justice Ginsburg noted that the
Court had previously addressed the issue of what constitutes “‘a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy’” per the TIA, and concluded
that the remedy is not the same for all plaintiffs who sue the
State, but is instead custom fit for taxpayers who sue the State.85
In the final part of the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg
Winn, 124 S. Ct at 2288 n.7.
Id. at 2289.
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408-09)
(citation omitted).
82 Id. at 2288.
83 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2288-89. See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1981) (taxpayers sought damages determined by alleged
tax overassessments based on taxation of real property); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 510 (1981) (taxpayer refused to pay state taxes because she deemed them
unfair); Ark. v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 824 (1997) (corporations
claimed they were exempt from state taxes and refused to pay); Nat’l Private Truck
Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 584 (1995) (action sought to prevent
State from collecting taxes).
84 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2289.
85 Id. (citing Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 528 (holding that “Illinois’ legal remedy that
provides property owners paying property taxes under protest a refund without interest
in two years is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy under the [TIA]”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 411 (holding that “a state-court
remedy is plain, speedy and efficient only if it provides the taxpayer with a full hearing
and judicial determination at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to
the tax”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
78
79
80
81
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discussed how there have been many federal court decisions,
including decisions of the Court that “have reached the merits of
third-party constitutional challenges to tax benefits without
mentioning the TIA.”86 Justice Ginsburg held that, “[c]onsistent
with the decades-long understanding prevailing on this issue,”
the challenge to the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit brought by the
Taxpayers may be adjudicated in federal district court without
any TIA opposition, thereby affirming the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.87
D. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent,88 criticized the
majority for “show[ing] great skepticism for the state courts’
ability to vindicate constitutional wrongs” and for treating state
courts as “second rate constitutional arbiters.”89 Justice Kennedy
offered two points as evidence of the majority’s stance: (1) the
majority’s interpretation of the TIA conflicts with the plain
language and a literal reading of the statute’s terms, and (2) the
majority’s assertion that Congress, in enacting the TIA, did not
intend to include third-party suits that do not seek to stop the
collection of a tax imposed on plaintiffs is not supported by the
legislative history of the TIA.90 Justice Kennedy disapproves of
the “[d]ismissive treatment” afforded by the majority to the state
courts as constitutional arbiters, since the TIA expressly provides
for a “federal safeguard:” federal court intervention if the State
court fails to provide “‘a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.’”91
Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, the majority disregards
“the balance the [TIA] strikes between federal and state court
adjudication.”92
Justice Kennedy notes that while “unexamined custom” may
have allowed some cases in the past to proceed as though the TIA
86 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2291. See, e.g., Byrne v. Pub. Funds for Pub. Sch. of N.J., 590
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding a state tax deduction for parents with children who
attend private schools is a violation of the Establishment Clause), aff’d, 442 U.S. 907
(1979); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state
tax benefit for parents of children who attend private schools is a violation of the
Establishment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state tax deduction for
parents of children who attend parochial schools is not a violation of the Establishment
Clause); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding a state statute that
exempts certain religious books from a state tax is a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
87 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2292.
88 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion.
89 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2292-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2293.
92 Id.
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does not apply to challenges to state tax credits, this
“unexamined custom” is not conclusive, and the terms and
purpose of the TIA alone are conclusive and controlling in
determining the scope of the TIA.93 To determine whether the
TIA bars the federal district court from granting injunctive relief
against the STO tax credit, Justice Kennedy presented two
necessary inquiries: (1) define “assessment,” as used in the TIA,
and (2) decide whether an injunction preventing the Director of
Revenue from permitting the STO tax credit “would enjoin,
suspend, or restrain an assessment” for purposes of the TIA.94
Like the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the
term “assessment” is not to be understood in isolation, and must
instead be read in light of the surrounding terms in the TIA.95
Similar to the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the TIA
was modeled on the AIA,96 which provides “that federal courts
may not restrain or enjoin an ‘assessment or collection of any
[federal] tax.’”97 In order to determine the meaning of the term
“assessment” as used in the AIA, Justice Kennedy referred to
other provisions of the Code.98 Justice Kennedy concluded that,
when read together, the provisions of the Code indicate that an
assessment, for purposes of the AIA, “must at the least
encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability,”
and “[t]he recording of the [taxpayer’s] liability on the
Government’s tax rolls is itself an assessment.”99 Therefore,
because the TIA was modeled on the AIA, it follows that the term
“assessment,” as used in the TIA, should be interpreted according
to the Code’s use of the term, indicating that an “assessment”
pertains to “a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.”100
According to Justice Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit should not
have principally relied on a dictionary definition in determining
the meaning of “assessment,” since it is imperative that the
definition be considered in light of the prior statute on which the
TIA was based.101 Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s
reliance on a lay dictionary definition of “assessment” is that the
Ninth Circuit used a dictionary that was not available in the year
Id.
Id.
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)(2005).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
Id. at 2294.
Id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here, as here, Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress can normally be
presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at
least insofar as it affects the new statute.”).
101 Id.
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
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the TIA was enacted.102 Justice Kennedy further noted that the
Ninth Circuit omitted a relevant definition of “assessment” from
the dictionary it used: “(2) to fix or determine the amount of
(damages, a tax, a fine, etc.).”103 Justice Kennedy found comfort
in Judge Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion from denial of rehearing
en banc, which noted that the Ninth Circuit would have
discovered relevant, broader definitions of “assessment” had it
looked in different lay dictionaries and the Code.104
Justice Kennedy addressed the Taxpayers’ argument
alleging that the TIA does not prohibit the injunction against the
STO tax credits, since the Director of Revenue, even after the
STO tax credit is enjoined, will be able to enforce taxpayer
liabilities, and the elimination of the STO tax credit will actually
increase tax revenue.105
Justice Kennedy dismissed this
argument, since it ignores some highly relevant wording in the
TIA: “under State law.”106 According to Justice Kennedy, the TIA
prohibits federal district courts “from enjoining, suspending, or
restraining a State from recording the taxpayer liability that
state law mandates.”107 A.R.S. § 1089 is an Arizona State law,
and is necessary in determining an Arizona taxpayer’s tax
liability to the State.108 Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy,
a federal court order directing the Director of Revenue to refrain
from recording on the State’s tax rolls taxpayer liability in
absence of the STO tax credit would effectively prevent the
Director of Revenue from accurately recording taxpayer liability
under State law.109 This sort of directive order, according to
Justice Kennedy, is precisely what the plain language of the TIA
forbids.110
Justice Kennedy next distinguished prior cases used by the
majority to support the majority’s position that the Court and
other federal courts have adjudicated non-taxpayer challenges to
tax credits without impediment from the AIA.111 These cases are
distinguishable on the grounds that if the plaintiffs in these suits
Id.
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
105 Id. at 2295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003)).
107 Id. at 2296.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The
preferred course of raising [such tax exemption and deduction] objections in a suit for
refund is not available. In this situation we cannot read the statute to bar the present
suit.”).
102
103
104
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had been barred by the AIA they would have had no other forum
in which to adjudicate their claims.112 According to Justice
Kennedy, the TIA, unlike the AIA, by its own explicit terms
ensures that an acceptable forum exists for those suits that it
bars.113 Where a State court is unable to provide “‘a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy,’” federal district courts are the next
available forum, and ultimately, the litigant may resort to the
United States Supreme Court, whether the case was originally
heard in a federal district court or a State court.114 Justice
Kennedy noted that the majority mistakenly failed to address
this exception in the TIA, and that this exception “represents a
congressional judgment about the balance that should exist
between the respect due to the States (for both their
administration of tax schemes and their courts’ interpretation of
tax laws) and the need for constitutional vindication.”115 Based
on this codified exception in the TIA, Justice Kennedy concluded
that this exception does not apply to the instant case, since a
similar action was already heard in Arizona State court,116 in
which the State court was able to provide “‘a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy.’”117 Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy’s
reading of the TIA, the Taxpayers’ suit does not fall within this
exception to the TIA, and the federal district court accordingly
lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction, since the Taxpayers
were already afforded an adequate remedy in State court.118
Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for its interpretation
of the TIA’s legislative history, arguing that the majority’s
reading is inconsistent with earlier Court interpretations of the
TIA.119 Citing California v. Grace Brethren Church120 as a prime
example, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court has previously
understood the purpose of the TIA as “not only to protect the
[State] fisc but also to protect the State’s tax system
administration and tax policy implementation.”121 In Grace
Brethren Church, the Court held that “‘[i]f federal declaratory
relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax
administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers
might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2297.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003)).
Id.
See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2298.
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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state law.’”122 This quote from Grace Brethren Church, according
to Justice Kennedy, clearly demonstrates that the TIA’s primary
concern is to prevent federal court interference with a State’s
entire tax collection system, and not merely the revenue
collecting aspect of it.123 Based on this reading of the TIA,
Justice Kennedy disagrees with the majority’s decision, since the
majority assumed that the primary purpose of the TIA is to
prohibit federal district courts from issuing orders that would
decrease tax revenues in state funds.124 Justice Kennedy argued
that the TIA’s purpose is not limited to preventing federal court
orders that would decrease tax revenues, but is instead meant to
prevent federal court orders that would lead to a disruption in a
State’s entire tax collection efforts in any manner, which includes
invalidating state tax credits.125
In the final part of his dissent, Justice Kennedy addressed
the majority’s argument that federal courts, through “years of
unexamined habit,” have adjudicated suits challenging state tax
credits.126 Justice Kennedy dismissed this argument by stating
that “[t]he exercise of federal jurisdiction does not and cannot
establish jurisdiction,” and that “[w]hile [the Court] should not
reverse the course of our unexamined practice lightly, our
obligation is to give a correct interpretation of the statute.”127
Justice Kennedy argued that simply because the Court has never
before considered the jurisdictional issue in the case at bar, the
Court should not resort to following the unexamined habit of the
Court to hear challenges to state tax credits, and should instead
follow the clear statutory mandate of the TIA.128

122 Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
127 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
123 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2297-98.
125 Id. at 2298-99.
126 Id. at 2300.
127 Id. (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)
(holding that the “Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it
was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio.”)).
128 Id. at 2301.
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III. OPENING THE DOOR FOR FEDERAL COURT INTRUSION INTO
STATE TAX SYSTEMS—DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WINN HOLDING
AND ITS REASONING
A. The Majority Misinterpreted the Plain Language and Intent
of the TIA
1. The Majority Misinterpreted the Term “Assessment” as
Used in the TIA
Prior to the majority’s decision in Winn, the statutory
language of the TIA was seemingly clear, concise, and
unambiguous. The TIA prohibits federal district courts from
“enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or
collection” of any state tax as long as there is a “plain, speedy and
efficient remedy” in the state court.129 The issue presented before
the Winn Court was whether enjoining a state tax credit qualifies
as an interference with an “assessment” as that term is used in
the TIA.130 The plain language of the TIA is the correct starting
point for the Court’s determination, since plain and unambiguous
statutory language is the clearest indicator of congressional
intent, and therefore ends the inquiry.131
Understood in its most ordinary and sensible usage, in
relation to state taxes, “assessment . . . must at the least
encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.
This is what the taxpayer owes the Government.”132 Instead of
referring to the ordinary meaning of “assessment” as used in the
context of both the TIA and federal and state precedent, the
Ninth Circuit relied on a lay dictionary definition of
“assessment,” and concluded that an “assessment” was the
official estimate of the value of income or property used to
calculate a tax or the imposition of a tax on someone.133 The
most troubling part of the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the lay
dictionary definition is that the court ignored a more relevant
definition found in the same dictionary: “(2) to fix or determine
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (emphasis added).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281.
See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (holding that the
Court begins with the statutory language in its inquiry); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981) (“The starting point of our inquiry is the plain language of the
statute itself.”).
132 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Galletti, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 1553-54 (2004) (“In its numerous uses
throughout the Code, it is clear that the term ‘assessment’ refers to little more than the
calculation or recording of a tax liability. . . . The Federal tax system is basically one of
self-assessment, whereby each taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the
appropriate form . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
133 Winn v. Killian, 307 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).
129
130
131
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the amount of (damages, a tax, a fine, etc.).”134 This additional
definition is in accordance with the broad meaning ascribed to
the term “assessment” by both the Director of Revenue135 and the
dissent,136 and suggests that “assessment” refers to a taxpayer’s
overall tax liability to the government.137 A tax credit is used in
determining a taxpayer’s overall tax liability, since the amount of
the credit is deducted from the “below-the-line” amount of taxes a
taxpayer owes to the government.138
Definitions of “assessment” found in other dictionaries,
including lay dictionaries available in 1937 when the TIA was
enacted, also support this broad definition of “assessment.” For
example, a lay dictionary available in 1937 provides the following
relevant definitions of “assessment”: “act of apportioning or
determining an amount to be paid;” “the entire plan or scheme
fixed upon for charging or taxing.”139 In Black’s Law Dictionary,
“‘assessment’ is defined as ‘determining the share of a tax to be
paid by each of many persons’. . . .[and] ‘the process of
ascertaining and adjusting the shares respectively to be
contributed by several persons’ such as an individual’s final tax
bill.”140
What is perhaps the most relevant definition of the term
“assessment” is found in the Code, as it provides that
“assessment shall be made by recording the liability of the
taxpayer.”141 As Judge Kleinfeld correctly noted in his dissent,
“under the congressional understanding in the tax code,
‘assessment’ refers to the bottom line, how much money the
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 12 (“[A] ‘tax assessment’ is a tax bill: the
final amount owed to the government. Under that ordinary and sensible understanding of
the word ‘assessment,’ a federal court challenge to a state tax credit—a component of a
taxpayer’s ultimate liability—is barred by the plain terms of the [TIA].”).
136 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[A]n assessment . . . must at
the least encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.”) (emphasis
added).
137 Further evidence of the broad meaning of “assessment” is found by looking at
Arizona’s tax system. On the 2000 Arizona Resident Personal Income Tax Return (Form
140), Arizona taxpayers determine their ultimate tax liability by accounting for all
deductions and credits. See also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 16 n.4 (citing 85
C.J.S. Taxation § 1758 (2003) (“In making an assessment [of taxes], the assessing officer
should take into account all deductions and credits to which the taxpayer is lawfully
entitled, and compute them in the manner required by the statute.”) (emphasis added).
138 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (8th ed. 2004) ([A “tax credit” is] “[a]n amount
subtracted directly from one’s total tax liability, dollar for dollar, as opposed to a
deduction from gross income.”).
139 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
131 (2d ed. 1934).
140 Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (6th ed. 1990))
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
141 26 U.S.C. § 6203 (2005).
134
135
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taxpayer owes to the government in taxes, after consideration of
any credits as well as deductions.”142 This broad understanding
of the term “assessment” is the most common sense
understanding of the term, and is consistent with the broad
purpose intended by Congress in enacting the TIA. Because the
term “assessment” is followed by the terms “levy” and
“collection,”143 the TIA indicates a congressional intent to
encompass the entire taxing process, beginning with the
determination of the taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability (i.e., the
“assessment”) and concluding with the collection of that
liability.144
The Winn Court, in construing the meaning of the term
“assessment” to counter-intuitive limits, has effectively legislated
from the bench by disregarding the clear intent of Congress in
enacting the TIA, thereby allowing federal courts with already
overburdened dockets to hear cases that Congress specifically
legislated to exclude. By accepting an irrelevant lay dictionary
definition as conclusive authority, the Winn Court has effectively
undermined the Legislature in its capacity as the government
branch entrusted with the duty of creating and determining laws,
and has shown complete disregard for congressional purpose.
2. The TIA Should not be Limited to Instances of Tax
Collection
The majority erred in finding that the TIA pertains only to
those situations in which the State’s revenue collecting function
has been hindered. The Court has previously made clear that the
purpose of the TIA is to protect a State’s entire tax system and
not merely the revenue collecting aspect of it.145 Nowhere in the
language of the TIA is there mention of the TIA being limited to
situations in which a challenge to a State tax would hinder the
State’s ability to collect revenue.146 Quite the contrary, the
language of the TIA clearly demonstrates that “[t]he district
142 Winn, 321 F.3d at 912-13 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (emphasis added). See also American Civil Liberties Union Found. of La. v.
Bridges, 334 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (defining “assessment” as “‘the entire plan or
scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing’”).
143 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
144 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2298-99 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The
terms “assessment,” “levy,” and “collection” represent the three main stages of a State tax
system: (1) the determination of the taxpayer’s overall tax liability (“assessment”); (2) the
imposition of the tax (“levy”); and (3) collecting the tax owed (“collection”)).
145 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U.S. 393, 409 n.22 (1982) (“[T]he legislative history of the [TIA] demonstrates that
Congress worried not so much about the form of relief available in the federal courts, as
about divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere with state tax
administration.”).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
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courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”147
Because the TIA refers to “any tax,” it seems clear that even an
aspect of a State tax system that does not add to revenue
collection, such as a tax credit, is nevertheless meant to fall
under the purview of the TIA, since a tax credit is fundamentally
related to a State’s entire tax system.148
A federal court order that interferes with a state tax credit is
just as intrusive into a State’s tax system as is a federal court
order that interferes with a State’s ability to raise and collect
taxes.149 Accordingly, a tax credit should not be deemed to be
outside the purview of the TIA simply because a tax credit does
not lead to an increase in a State’s tax revenues.150 Tax scholars
agree that a tax credit is an imperative determination in the
assessment of a tax, and taking account for a tax credit is the
final step in determining a taxpayer’s overall tax liability.151 In
the case at bar, the majority should not have limited the term
“assessment” to the revenue collecting aspect of a State’s tax
system and should have instead interpreted the term to
encompass the taxpayer’s overall tax liability, tax credits
included.152
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. It is interesting to note that in a Ninth Circuit decision following Hibbs v.
Winn, the court discussed the legislative history and congressional intent behind the TIA,
stating that “[a]side from its general concern with protecting state revenues, Congress
viewed the [TIA] as a mechanism for steering challenges to state tax laws into state
courts.” May Trucking Co. v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 388 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 2004).
149 See, e.g., United Brewers Ass’n v. Perez, 592 F.2d 1212, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979)
(holding that litigation that would increase the amount of taxes collected would
nevertheless “disrupt the orderly collection and administration of state taxes”); In re
Gillis, 836 F.2d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the interference by the federal
courts into the state tax system is the same in degree and kind as a suit seeking to enjoin
a state tax”).
150 See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (holding that the
ultimate effect of invalidating a state tax exemption cannot be predicted with complete
accuracy).
151 See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
929 (13th ed. 2004) (“The final step in computing a taxpayer’s regular tax liability is to
reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability . . . by the amount of any tax credits allowed to the
taxpayer. The amount of tax that must be paid by the taxpayer when filing an income tax
return is generally less than the computed tax liability for the year, because the potential
payment is reduced by tax credits.”).
152 In a recent Fifth Circuit decision interpreting Hibbs v. Winn, the court was
confronted with the issue of whether the federal district courts could exercise proper
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that the State of Louisiana’s prestige license plate
program facially discriminates against pro-choice views, thus violating the First
Amendment. Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). The Henderson court
held that the costs associated with the prestige license plates were in fact “taxes,” and in
light of Hibbs v. Winn, the federal district court was barred from hearing the case as a
result of the TIA. Id. at 358-59. The Henderson court noted that, “Hibbs opened the
federal courthouse doors slightly notwithstanding the limits of the TIA.” Id. at 359.
147
148
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3. The Majority Ignored That There Existed a “Plain,
Speedy and Efficient Remedy” in Arizona State Court
The language of the TIA itself provides for the appropriate
time at which a federal court may intervene in the State tax
system: “where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may [not] be
had in the courts of such State.”153 As Justice Kennedy noted in
his dissenting opinion, the TIA has a “codified exception” to the
prohibition against federal court intervention, which allows
federal court interference in state tax systems only where the
taxpayer is unable to receive “‘a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy’” in her State court.154 Justice Ginsburg and the majority
overlooked this crucial language in the TIA, which represents the
fact that Congress has already made the determination as to
what sort of balance should exist among the federal and state
courts in regards to a State’s ability to administer its own tax
system.155
In the years following the enactment of the TIA, the Court
took a broad stance as to what constitutes a “‘plain, speedy and
efficient remedy in State court,’” often finding judicial remedies
in state courts to be inadequate.156 However, in more recent
decisions, the Court has narrowly construed the statutory
language of the TIA and seems to presume that state court
remedies are “plain, speedy and efficient” for purposes of the TIA,
thus prohibiting federal court intervention.157 As a result of
(emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Hibbs
decision as allowing federal district court intervention into a state tax matter in spite of
the TIA, only if “the suit’s success will enrich, not deplete, the government entity’s coffers.”
Id. (emphasis added).
153 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (emphasis added).
154 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2297 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 710; see, e.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1944) (holding that the federal district court was not
barred by the TIA because there was an absence of state court interpretations of the
contested tax law, and this created uncertainty sufficient to justify federal court
intervention); Hillsborough Twp. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 626 (1946) (holding that a
“plain, speedy and efficient remedy” did not exist in the State court, thus permitting the
federal district court to bypass the TIA, since there existed uncertainty as to the adequacy
of the state remedy); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 306 (1952)
(holding that because the taxpayer would have been required to file over 300 separate
claims in fourteen different counties under state law, the remedy was not “plain, speedy
and efficient,” and the federal district court was permitted to take jurisdiction as an
exception to the TIA).
157 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 711; see, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73
(1976) (holding that a State requirement that a taxpayer post a bond for the amount of
the tax in controversy in order to be heard in State court is a “‘plain, speedy and efficient
remedy,’” even though situations may exist in which the taxpayer is unable to post the
bond); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 528 (1981) (holding that the State
remedy was adequate, despite the fact that the taxpayer was required to pay the taxes
owed first and then sue for a refund, the taxpayer was not entitled to interest on the
refund if successful in court, and it usually took two years for the suit to be heard in State
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these recent cases, the Winn Court erred in allowing the
Taxpayers’ suit to proceed in federal district court, since there
existed a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in Arizona State
court, thus divesting the federal district court of subject matter
jurisdiction.158 This is evidenced by the 1999 Arizona Supreme
Court case Kotterman v. Killian, in which a group of Arizona
taxpayers, similarly situated to the Taxpayers in Winn,
challenged the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit on Establishment Clause
grounds.159 The Arizona Supreme Court ultimately held the
A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit to be a valid law, thus ruling against the
Killian taxpayers.160 It is notable that the United States
Supreme Court denied review of the Kotterman decision.161
Based on the current line of Supreme Court cases broadly
interpreting the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” requirement
in the TIA, the Winn Court should have ruled against the
Taxpayers, finding that they had an adequate remedy available
in State court, thus divesting the federal district courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over the case. As Justice Kennedy noted in
his dissenting opinion, the taxpayer who resorts to the State
court is not exclusively confined to the State court forum; the
United States Supreme Court is always an available federal
forum that will review any state court decision.162
B. The Majority’s Holding is Contrary to the Broad Federalism
Purpose of the TIA
1. The TIA was Enacted in the Broad Interest of State
Sovereignty
The TIA embodies principles of federalism: state
governments are given deference to administer their own tax
court); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982) (holding that
“because the appellees could seek a refund of their state unemployment insurance
taxes . . . their remedy under state law was ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ within the
meaning of the [TIA], and consequently, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to
issue injunctive or declaratory relief.”).
158 Following Hibbs v. Winn, the Ninth Circuit discussed what constitutes “plain,
speedy and efficient” for purposes of the TIA. May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Dep’t of
Transportation, 388 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2004). According to the May Trucking
Co. court, “[f]or state-court remedies to be ‘plain,’ the procedures available in state court
must be certain.” Id. at 1270 (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he ‘efficiency’ of a statecourt remedy generally turns on whether it imposes an ‘unusual hardship . . . requiring
ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy.’” Id. at 1271
(quoting Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 518).
159 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
160 Id. at 625.
161 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 625 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921
(1999).
162 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2297 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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systems without undue federal impediment since Congress
enacted the TIA in the interest of limiting federal interference
with the crucial principal of state sovereignty.163 States may
have a legitimate interest in promoting secondary school
education for parents and their children because secondary
schools are not state-funded, and the respective State may have
an interest in decreasing the amount of children attending the
public schools for state-revenue purposes. In enacting A.R.S. §
1089, the Arizona Legislature may have been attempting to
persuade more Arizona taxpayers to send their children to
secondary schools in order to lighten the burden on the State fisc
since fewer funds would need to be directed to public schools if
more children were attending secondary schools.164 As an
incentive to send their children to secondary schools, Arizona
taxpayers would receive the STO tax credit embodied in A.R.S. §
1089.165 The Arizona Legislature made the determination that a
tax credit, as opposed to a tax deduction, was the most
persuasive means of motivating taxpayer’s to send their children
to secondary schools, since a tax credit represents a greater
overall deduction in tax liability.166 Regardless of the Arizona
legislature’s intent in enacting A.R.S. § 1089, the contested STO
tax credit is clearly a matter of Arizona State law, and the Winn
majority erred in allowing federal courts to take jurisdiction over
the matter in spite of the TIA’s bar on federal intrusion in state
163 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 710. After the Court’s decision in Winn, the
Ninth Circuit noted, in May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., the two comity
concerns furthered by the TIA: “[f]irst, ‘[t]he Act is a gesture of comity toward states;
recognizing the centrality of tax collection to the operation of government, the Act
prevents taxpayers from running to federal court to stymie the collection of state
taxes’. . . . Second, recognizing that challenges to state tax laws are ‘more properly heard
in the state courts,’ the Act ensures that state courts are able to entertain challenges to
their own tax laws in the first instance.” May Trucking Co. v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 388
F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
164 See Warren Richey, Case Could Boost Funding for Private Schools, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 20, 2004, at 2, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/csmonitor/s/20040120/20jan2004091835.html (“[A] ruling [in
favor of Arizona in this case] would also provide a green light to those seeking increased
government funding of religious schools, provided they have the state legislature’s
support and the state judiciary’s approval.”).
165 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(A)-(B) (2004).
166 See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 151, at 929-30 (“A credit of a certain dollar
amount is more advantageous to the taxpayer than a deduction of the same dollar amount,
because it reduces tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas a deduction reduces only taxable
income with a corresponding but smaller reduction in tax liability. Deductions effect
greater tax savings as the taxpayer’s tax rate increases; in contrast, credits have the same
dollar saving for all taxpayers who otherwise would pay tax, regardless of their tax
brackets. Tax legislation at one time reflected some movement away from deductions
toward credits, possibly because of a policy decision that credits are more equitable. With
the adoption of modified flat tax rates, the movement from deductions to credits stalled
although it has picked up some momentum in recent legislation.”) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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tax matters. As noted by Justice Kennedy, “[t]he TIA protects
the responsibility of the States and their courts to administer
their own tax systems and to be accountable to the citizens of the
State for their policies and decisions.”167
A further problem potentially spawned out of the Winn
decision is that multi-state corporations are now able to engage
in federal court forum shopping, which is one of the primary
actions Congress intended to prevent in enacting the TIA.168
Multi-state or out-of-state corporations are now given the
opportunity to move directly into federal court through diversity
jurisdiction in order to avoid a possibly prejudicial state forum.169
An out-of-state corporation may wish to avoid a state court forum
in order to avoid local biases and local favoritism towards local
corporations. Additionally, a foreign corporation challenging a
state tax law may feel as though a state court would not be as
quick to strike down the state tax law as would a federal court.170
As a result of the majority’s decision in Winn, an out-of-state
corporation that is troubled by the tax breaks afforded to local
corporations, whether it be in the form of a tax credit, deduction,
or exemption, is now able to challenge the State tax law in
federal court, despite the fact that the State may have a
legitimate interest in promoting the welfare of its local
corporations.171 According to Winn, as long as the foreign
corporation’s challenge would not have the effect of decreasing
state revenues, the TIA will not act as a bar to the challenge, and
the States will no longer be guaranteed the ability to afford
benefits to their local corporations and businesses, which is a
serious infringement on principles of state sovereignty. This
result is especially unfortunate in light of the fact that in
discussing the legislative history of the TIA, Justice Ginsburg
recognized that one of the twin objectives of the TIA was “to
eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek
injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state
This
corporations asserting diversity jurisdiction.”172
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Leading Case: F. Tax Injunction Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 486, 491 (2004); see
also 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 986 (2005) (“The two purposes of the TIA
are: (1) to eliminate discrimination between state citizens who are required to pursue
relief regarding illegal tax assessments in state court and foreign corporations operating
in the state which could sue under diversity jurisdiction of federal courts; and (2) to
prevent such foreign corporations from paralyzing state fiscal operations with dilatory
and expensive legal actions in federal court.”) (footnote omitted).
169 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003).
170 See High Court’s Decision Means New Alternative for Corporations, STATE INCOME
TAX ALERT (CCH, Chicago, Ill.), July 15, 2004, at 2-3.
171 See id.
172 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2287 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
167
168
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demonstrates that the Court was at the very least reckless in
failing to account for the fact that foreign corporations are now
able, as a result of Winn, to side-step state courts and to instead
enjoy a more favorable federal forum.
2. The Majority Treats State Court Judges as Inferior
Constitutional Arbiters
As noted by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion, the
Winn majority’s decision seems to rest on a presumption that
state courts are incapable of properly adjudicating federal
constitutional issues, and that these issues are better left to the
federal courts.173 In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted
that when some of the states were using state tax credits as a
means of circumventing Brown v. Board of Education,174 it was
“[t]he federal courts, [the Supreme] Court among them, [that]
adjudicated the ensuing challenges . . .
and upheld the
This
Constitution’s equal protection requirement.”175
presumptuous treatment of state courts is unfounded and
dangerous to the fundamental principles of federalism on which
our Constitution is based.176
Treating state courts as “second rate constitutional arbiters,”
according to Justice Kennedy, is completely unjustified in light of
the fact that the TIA itself has a “federal safeguard:” the TIA
allows for federal courts to take jurisdiction when the State court
is unable “to provide ‘a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.’”177
Furthermore, a litigant in a State court always has resort to the
ultimate federal forum for review of the State court decision: the
United States Supreme Court.178 Apparent from the majority’s
decision is the majority’s fear that state courts are unable to
correct violations of the federal Constitution, and that these
violations can only be corrected when reviewed by a federal court.
This fear, however, is unfounded and completely ignores
constitutional jurisprudence established by Court precedent.
Prior Court decisions have clearly established that state courts
are not to be treated as inferior interpreters of the Constitution,
and in the case a State court incorrectly interprets federal law,
the Court is always available to correct any misinterpretations of
Id. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281 (majority opinion).
See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“A doctrine
based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would run counter to basic principles of
federalism.”).
177 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2297; see also Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (arguing
that “[s]tate judges take the same oath to uphold the federal Constitution that [federal
judges] do, and like [federal judges] are subject to federal Supreme Court review”).
173
174
175
176
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the federal law.179 Furthermore, by treating state courts as
inferior constitutional interpreters, the majority has effectively
disregarded Congress’ determination that federal courts are not
the only available forums in which a litigant may present
The majority therefore erred in
constitutional issues.180
assuming that state courts are inadequate interpreters of the
federal Constitution in relation to their federal court
counterparts, since the majority ignored the fact that the state
court litigant always has resort to the Court to review the State
court decision.
Finally, by treating state courts as inferior constitutional
interpreters, the Winn majority ignored the fact that state court
judges are required by the federal Constitution to uphold federal
law. In Arizona, State judges are required to take an oath before
assuming office that requires them to “support the Constitution
of the United States.”181 The Court itself has previously held
that state courts are obliged to uphold the federal Constitution,
and that state judges are entirely competent to adjudicate
constitutional issues.182 When coupled with the fact that the
Winn majority disregarded the availability of the Court as a
federal forum for a state court litigant, the fact that the majority
pays no credence to the constitutional requirement that state
judges uphold the Constitution in performing their duties leaves
us with the “unfortunate result [that state courts are deprived] of
179 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (establishing the authority for the
judiciary to review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts); Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 342 (1816) (holding that the Constitution presumes that the
Supreme Court has the authority to review state court decisions in order to ensure
uniformity in the interpretation of federal laws); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 414
(1821) (holding that criminal defendants could seek Supreme Court review of their State
court conviction when they claimed that their conviction violated the Constitution);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (holding that the Supreme Court has the
authority to review state actions).
180 See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1982) (“Carving
out a special exception for taxpayers raising First Amendment claims would undermine
significantly Congress’ primary purpose to limit drastically federal district court
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19
(1981) (“The [TIA] embodied Congress’ decision to transfer jurisdiction over a class of
substantive federal claims from the federal district courts to the state courts, as long as
state-court procedures were ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ and final review of the
substantive federal claim could be obtained in [the] Court.”).
181 A.Z. CONST. art. 6, § 26 provides the following in regards to the oath an Arizona
State judge must take prior to assuming office: “Each justice, judge and justice of the
peace shall . . . take and subscribe an oath that he will support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Arizona, and that he will faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of his office to the best of his ability.” (emphasis added).
182 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“The States and their officers
are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that
comport with the constitutional design. [The Court is] unwilling to assume the States will
refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.”).
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the first opportunity to hear [state tax] cases and to grant the
relief the Constitution requires.”183
3. Principles of Comity Preclude Federal Interference with
State Tax Systems
Although the Winn majority found it proper to look past the
seemingly clear and unambiguous statutory language of the TIA
in holding that the TIA does not apply to a federal challenge to a
state tax credit, federal courts are still bound by the comity
doctrine,184 which requires federal courts to defer to state courts
when a fundamental state interest is being challenged.185 As
noted by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion, a federal
court order affecting a state tax credit in any manner “will
thwart and replace the State’s chosen tax policy,” which is
precisely what the judicial principle of comity is meant to
prohibit.186
A federal court order declaring the Arizona STO tax credit
unconstitutional and therefore invalid is inherently disruptive to
a State’s tax system, since it will prevent the State from making
a final determination of its taxpayer’s tax bills.187 Arizona’s
decision to offer the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit to its taxpayers is
purely an Arizona State interest, and as such, it should be
afforded the respect and deference mandated by the judicial
comity doctrine, since “[i]t is a troubling proposition for [the]
Court to proceed on the assumption that the State’s interest in
limiting the tax burden on its citizens to that for which its law
provides is a secondary policy, deserving of little respect from
[the Court].”188 In California v. Grace Brethren Church, the
Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in
administering their respective tax systems, and “if federal
declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments,
Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2301 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (2d pocket ed., West 2001) (defining “comity” as
“[c]ourtesy among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions),
involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts”; and defining
“judicial comity” as “[t]he respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to another
state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws and judicial decisions”) (emphasis
added).
185 See Leading Case: F. Tax Injunction Act, supra note 168, at 495, 496 n.80
(discussing how the principle of comity stems from the abstention doctrine found in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which prevents federal courts from interfering with
a state case in which there exists an adequate state court remedy, and when it would be
proper to abstain from taking jurisdiction when a respect for state functions demands it).
186 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle
Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981) (noting that the principal purpose of the TIA is “to
limit drastically federal court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as
the collection of taxes”).
187 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 28.
188 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300.
183
184
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state tax administration might be thrown into disarray.”189
Furthermore, the TIA is meant to ensure that state courts
are granted the exclusive authority to interpret state law, and in
turn, to ensure that the State is accountable to its citizens for its
policies and decisions.190
A federal court order either
invalidating or upholding a state tax law has the unfortunate
effect of a lack of political accountability—distraught citizens are
unable to hold state officials accountable because the challenge
was adjudicated in federal court, and federal judges are
appointed officials who are not subject to the political election
process as are state judges. As previously noted by the Court,
even if a state tax law has federal constitutional implications, as
does the Arizona STO tax credit, “federal constitutional issues
are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues
of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state
courts.”191 In the distinct interest of maintaining longstanding
principles of judicial comity among the federal and state courts,
the Winn Court erred in allowing the challenge to the Arizona
STO tax credit to proceed in federal court, since principles of
comity demand federal courts to refrain from interfering in so
delicate and vital an interest as a State’s tax system. As noted
by Justice Kennedy, “the majority’s ruling has implications far
beyond this case and will most certainly result in federal courts
in other States and in other cases being required to interpret
state tax law in order to complete their review of challenges to
state tax statutes.”192
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether the Winn Court has opened Pandora’s Box in terms
of federal court intrusion into state tax systems has yet to be
determined, and the true ramifications of the Court’s decision are
speculative at the present moment. However, what remains true
and apparent is that the Winn majority disregarded the plain
language of a seemingly clear, concise, and unambiguous federal
statute and stretched the congressional intent of the TIA to
illogical levels. By accepting the Ninth Circuit’s definition of
“assessment,” the Court has essentially approved of federal
courts that pick and choose among relevant definitions of a
statutory term in order to use those definitions necessary to
189 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 410 (1982) (quoting Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
190 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191 Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410 (quoting Perez, 401 U.S. at 128 n.17
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
192 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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achieve a desired statutory interpretation.
The Winn decision has struck a vital blow to the principles of
federalism on which our constitutional jurisprudence and
maintenance of state sovereignty are based since federal courts
are now granted jurisdiction in a realm previously off-limits to
these courts: state tax systems. State court judges, in the eyes of
the Winn Court, are merely second-rate constitutional
interpreters who are not as fit for interpreting delicate
constitutional issues as are their federal court counterparts.
This result is especially troubling in light of the fact that state
courts are traditionally known as courts of general jurisdiction,
fully competent to litigate any constitutional issue so long as the
issue does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
As a result of Winn, with some clever pleading, a taxpayer or
taxpaying entity seeking to challenge a State tax law is able to
sidestep the State court for the more favorable federal forum, so
long as the challenge does not inhibit the State’s ability to collect
revenue. As this Note has attempted to demonstrate, Congress
was not exclusively concerned with protecting a State’s ability to
collect revenue in enacting the TIA, but instead intended to
exclude federal courts from interfering with the State’s entire tax
system in any way so long as the State court provides an
adequate remedy to the litigant. The Winn Court failed to
acknowledge the clear intent of Congress in enacting the TIA,
thus opening the door for federal court intervention in a
traditionally restricted state area.
Hopefully, in light of this troubling decision, Congress, or the
Court itself, will act quickly to remedy this wrong in order to
maintain fundamental principles of federalism and state
sovereignty in the administration of state tax systems. The
integrity of our federal judicial system and the maintenance of
our States as sovereign entities demand no less.

